Court scholars have a voracious appetite for Supreme Court preference measures. Several papers question whether widely-used Martin and Quinn scores provide valid intertemporal measures, calling into question virtually an entire generation of quantitative research on the Court. This paper discusses the challenges of inter-temporal preference estimation and revises, updates and extends Bailey and Maltzman (2011) to present Supreme Court preference estimates that are more defensibly comparable across time and institutions.
time. Many applications that use Martin and Quinn scores use them because they are "on a comparable scale over time" (Martin and Quinn 2007, 366) and "allow for comparisons of ideological positions for justices who never served with each other" (Bartels 2009, 490) .
Such statements are true only if "the distribution of case characteristics is constant over time" (Ho and Quinn 2010, 845; Bailey 2007) . Figure 1 illustrates the role this assumption plays for Martin and Quinn scores. The top row shows ideal points of three justices on "Case 1," a case on which two of the justices voted liberally and one voted conservatively. Suppose we assume that justices' ideal points can vary over time (as most work on the Court does) and consider possible ideal points on "Case 2," a case on which one of the justices voted liberally and two voted conservatively. In the first scenario, the case cutpoints on Case 2 is the same as for Case 1 and this means that justice 2 has moved to the right. However, the second scenario shows a situation in which the case cutpoint has moved left and justice 2
has not moved at all. Both scenarios for Case 2 are logically possible and, indeed, highly plausible as we could easily imagine cases that have similar ideological cutpoints as earlier cases and cases that have different cutpoints than earlier cases. For measurement, however, deciding which scenario is most accurate is crucial. Looking at the vote tally on Case 2 of two conservatives versus one liberal provides no guidance and we must rely on some external assumption or information. Martin and Quinn essentially assume that only scenario 1 is true.
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It is possible that the Martin and Quinn approach could mistake a shift in case cutpoints for a shift in justice ideal points. (Grofman and Brazil 2002; Bailey 2007) .
1 More precisely, their approach assumes that the distribution of votes is the same across terms. I discuss this period in detail in Section 3.
Concerns about inter-temporal comparability lead Ho and Quinn (2010, 846) to say in "How Not to Lie with Judicial Votes" that "inferring meaning into cardinal values is misguided" and to recommend that the Martin and Quinn measures should be used as ordinal measures. If accepted, this claim is highly consequential for the statistical literature on the Supreme Court as the scores (and their "judicial common space" offshoots) have become a mainstay of empirical analysis. There are two directions one can go in response to Ho and Quinn's critique. One is to accept it and to use Martin and Quinn scores only as ordinal measures. The question then becomes whether the additional complexity associated with calculating and interpreting the scores is worth using them over simple measures of the percent of time a justice votes conservatively, which generally control for agenda effects and provide ordinally accurate rankings of justices within terms or natural Courts (Chiou and Imai 2008, 6) .
Although ordinal Martin and Quinn scores would be less useful than currently distributed cardinal scores, they do offer four benefits over percent conservative scores. First, as with any item-response theory (IRT) model, ordinal Martin and Quinn scores do not weight all votes equally. Those votes that do not divide justices according to "ideology" get a discrimination parameter near zero which decreases their influence in the calculation of preferences. Second, the model incorporates information from previous periods. Practically, this means that if two justices vote conservatively a similar percentage of time in a given term, then the one who was more conservative in the previous term will be estimated as more conservative. Third, by controlling for case characteristics, the Martin and Quinn ordinal scores deal with situations in which justices do not vote on the same cases in a given term. Finally, Martin and Quinn scores come with measures of uncertainty and percent conservative scores typically do not.
Despite these advantages, ordinal Martin and Quinn scores do not differ dramatically
Poole and Rosenthal common space scores. Although using the first dimension of Poole and Rosenthal scores seems natural, it is actually quite controversial. Segregationist southern senators such as James Eastland (D, MS) are moderates on Poole and Rosenthal's first dimension. It seems more apt to use Poole and Rosenthal's second dimension (on which these members of Congress were arch-conservative) to characterize political preferences relative the Court Size of circles proportional to number of observations focuses on what can be done to generate intertemporally comparable scores and presents a bridging approach to account for agenda change.
Polarity Another challenge in estimating judicial preferences is determining the ideological polarity of cases (Fischman and Law 2009, 154; Ho and Quinn 2010, 836 One is to estimate preference change in terms of a polynomial function (Bailey 2007; Poole and Rosenthal 1997) . This approach fits a broad range of non-linear and non-monotonic preference change and enables preferences from the previous period to provide information about preferences in a subsequent period. The approach does not, however, handle discrete shocks to preferences very well. Suppose, for example, that justices shift left or right in response to an election outcome. The polynomial approach will smooth out this shift, something that could be detrimental to many research questions.
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When Martin and Quinn estimate preferences separately for each term for each justice, they incorporate information about preferences in the previous term. They do this via Bayesian priors that "smooth" preferences over time. In contrast to the polynomial approach, defendants. Justices Scalia, Souter, Thomas and Roberts argued for a more lenient outcome. 5 For this reason Bailey and Maltzman (2011, chapter 6) estimate preferences separately in the period just before and just after an election in order to assess separation of powers shifts related shifts in Court behavior.
preference estimates can still shift discretely, although not as much as they would without priors. One of the challenges is "tuning" the model by selecting a smoothing parameter. This is more of an art, than a science (Martin and Quinn 2002, 147) .
Heterogeneity In addition, questions about dimensionality of judicial preferences lurk in any measurement discussion. Changing dimensionality could induce appearances of preference change where they may be none. Farnsworth (2007 Farnsworth ( , 1896 Kennedy's preferences may appear to drift to the left relative to Rehnquist's when they haven't really changed at all.
If justices' preferences differ across substantive issue areas, a one dimensional model could conflate preference change and agenda change. Martin and Quinn (2002, 146 ) present evidence inconsistent with such a worry, as the "first" dimension in their models seems to explain across multiple issue areas reasonably well. Lauderdale and Clark (2012) , however, find that when each case is defined in relation to a substantive area and the cases it most cites, there are definite signs of multidimensionality as the identity of the Court median varies substantially across specific cases, even within a term.
Another way in which there could be multiple dimensionality is that justices could value legal principles and these principles could ebb and flow in cases across issues. For example, if it is indeed the case that Kennedy is distinctively protective of free speech claims, this could not only have the measurement implications Farnsworth highlights, but it could also have implications for how ideology and the law matter on the Court. Bailey and Maltzman (2008, 2011) identify a large number of justices who systematically deviate from their one dimensional preferences when precedent, congressional deference and free speech are involved.
A bridging approach to preference measurement
This paper addresses each of the major challenges described above. It uses a bridging approach to deal with agenda change. It uses position taking by non-Court actors to identify the ideological polarity of cases. It uses a prior-based flexible approach to model preference dynamics and it is expandable to include covariates that capture an important subset of factors that may not be accounted for by the standard left-right ideological dimension. I discuss each of these in turn in this section.
Controlling for agenda with bridge observations As discussed above, the impediment to using Martin and Quinn scores as cardinal preference measures for the Court is Martin and
Quinn's assumption that the Court agenda does not change over time.
6 If, however, we can control for agenda change, we may be able to create measures that are comparable over time.
We do not need the agenda to be identical in each period; we simply need to ensure that the agenda change is identifiable.
Therefore, this paper builds on previous bridging estimates (Bailey 2007; Bailey and Maltzman 2008, 2011) The reliance of this approach on external data is both a strength and a weakness. It is a strength in the sense that if anyone has specific reasons to justify thinking that the Court has moved to the right or left, this can be incorporated into the estimation. That is, if someone believes the Court has become more anti-accused and can identify either a case that is clearly to the right of a previous case (based on the substance of a ruling) or finds instances of justices critiquing earlier liberal opinions, then this information can be incorporated and used to help pin down relative movement over time. The use of this data also creates challenges, including not only the effort of identifying such external information, but also the possibility for subjectivity to enter in the collection or coding of data. That the data is available in the supplemental material is one check on this concern.
Case polarity This paper addresses the polarity questions by using the policy stands taken by elected officials to identify the liberal-conservative valence for Court cases for which the valence is debatable. This follows the insight in Harvey and Woodruff (2011) that external actors provide a useful benchmark for coding Court cases because they allow us to identify ideological polarity even if nine justices do not provide clear evidence of it, either due to non-ideological factors or by chance. In practice, codings typically follow Spaeth codings.
The major exceptions relate to campaign finance and government-funded marketing. More details are in the supplemental material.
Preference dynamics For each preference estimate for a justice in a given year we implement a Bayesian prior based on the ideal point in the previous period. The variance of this prior determines how much smoothing occurs. If it is set at a very large value, then almost no smoothing occurs; if it is set at a very small value, then preferences change very little from one period to the next. As discussed in Martin and Quinn (2002, 147) specific estimates can be sensitive to the setting of such a parameter and there is no consensus way to determine its value; as with Martin and Quinn, I set this value at a point at which the estimates do indeed move from period to period, but not too dramatically. Users of these scores (and Martin and Quinn scores) should note, though, the role this smoothing parameter plays.
it reports estimates based on models that include covariates that account for at least some important determinants of voting that may not reflect standard left-right ideological conflict.
For example, suppose that some justices do indeed respect precedent and vote in favor of precedent against their ideological predisposition. These votes will appear moderate in left-right terms, but do not necessarily reflect moderation in conventional policy-ideological terms.
I therefore also estimate models that control for five non-policy variables. Three were included in Bailey and Maltzman (2008, 2011) : precedent, congressional deference and free speech. Two are new: deference to the executive and to dealing with Sixth Amendment challenges. In all these areas there are reasons to suspect that at least some justices deviate from conventional left-right ideology. The manner in which these variables are included is described in the statistical model below. These estimates are offered more in the spirit of a robustness check than a final word for two reasons. First, it is impossible to come up with a set of covariates that comprehensively captures non-ideological factors. Certainly the set here is not comprehensive. Second, the meaning of the "preference measures" is nuanced and whether one wants a measure net of legal factors depends on context. For example, suppose again that justices are indeed influenced by precedent and this produces moderate-looking votes. At one level we could describe these justices as, say, ideological liberals who respect precedent. We could equally validly say that a liberal who respects precedent is effectively a moderate as he or she does not vote as consistently liberal as a liberal justice who ignores precedent would.
The second measure taken to deal with potential multidimensionality is to limit the data set. I include only Court votes on the social policy dimension that has dominated the Court docket in the post-war area. This dimension covers crime, civil rights, free speech, religion, abortion and privacy. Focusing on these issues allows us to focus on the most relevant areas of political-judicial exchange and to minimize chances that our results are affected by behavior on secondary issues that did not necessarily have the same structure of preferences. 
where y itv is 1 if justice i votes for the conservative position in term t on case v, α v is the vote "discrimination" parameter (see appendix for more details), θ it is the ideal point of the justice at the time of proposal (the higher the value, the more conservative the justice) and κ v is the vote cutpoint. For cases and votes for which we have information on the relative locations of the cutpoints, we constrain the cutpoints to satisfy the inequality constraint implied by the information.
The model that includes covariates is cornell.edu/supct/cases/name.htm), coded as a salient case in Epstein and Segal (2000) , included in the CQ's key cases list, a President or member of Congress or non-contemporaneous justice took a position on the case, the case has clear cutpoint relation to another case, the case implicates precedent, deference or speech as coded. There is no clear way to determine whether the ideal points based on the model with covariates are "better" as it depends on the concept one is trying to assess. If one is interested, for example, in relations between the Court and Congress one is probably better off with a model without covariates as this measures the differences between Congress and justices, regardless of the source of the voting by the Court. In standard separation of powers models, for example, it does not matter why justices vote against the policy preferences of Congress, only that they do. On the other hand, if one is trying to identify the "ideology" of justices in a way that is independent of agenda or case characteristics, one may prefer the estimates based on the model with covariates. The judicial preferences can then be adjusted based on the other estimated parameters depending on whether overturning precedent or speech and so forth are invoked by a given case or line of cases.
Cutpoints over time Figure 6 shows the average case cutpoints for Supreme Court cases Ginsburg's opinion stating that a judge, not a jury, could find certain sentencing facts).
On every one of these cases, Kennedy voted with Breyer (and sometimes other liberals).
These votes seem to reflect less a shift to the right than the "Farnsworthian" (see page 11)
emergence of a distinctive cleavage on the Court.
The percent of times Kennedy voted conservatively bounced from 65% to 53% to 64% The question is whether these changes reflected changes in Kennedy's ideology or normal variation in the cutpoints of cases on the Court's docket.
(Comstock, discussed earlier, was the tenth case they polled), eight were conservative decisions (Citizens United, Heller, Salazar, Ricci, Crawford, Baze, Parents Involved, Gonzales v. Carhart) and respondents agreed with the actual decision 71.6 percent of the time. It was the one liberal decision in the survey, Hamdan, that had the lowest level of popular support, at only 29.9 percent agreement. Given that the public has not shifted dramatically to the right (Stimson 1999 (Stimson , 2012 ) then these results are in tension with Martin and Quinn's claim that the current Court is the most conservative Court in the postwar era.
Conclusion
Measuring Supreme Court preferences is important for empirical testing and, in turn, for intellectual development in the study of the Supreme Court. Many studies need to make cardinal comparisons, investigating preference change or "spatial distances" between actors or preference differences across institutional boundaries. Scholars frequently use Martin and
Quinn scores for these purposes.
The problem is that it may be, as Ho and Quinn (2010, 846) argue, "misguided" to use the Martin and Quinn measures in this way. Theoretically, cardinal use of the Martin and
Quinn scores requires an unrealistic assumption about fixed agenda space. Practically, the Martin and Quinn scores produce highly debatable claims that the Roe and Furman courts were among the most conservative of the post-war era.
This paper presents an alternative approach that directly engages with the issue of changing agendas by using bridging information over time to produce intertemporally comparable preference estimates for Supreme Court justices from 1950 to 2011. The estimates do not
